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I Introduction
This article questions whether offshore native title claims are 
presenting discrete conceptual and practical obstacles for the 
judiciary. Its aim is to chart the proverbial waters and provide 
an overview of both the legislation and the jurisprudence. 
The article also discusses alternative or complementary 
mechanisms for protecting Indigenous interests in sea 
country, including land rights legislation, sea closures and 
heritage registrations. Much of the judicial consideration of 
offshore areas, or sea country, appears to have been treated 
as an adjunct to the primary issues put before the court. 
The problematic legacy of this is increasingly evident as 
offshore claims are now arriving at the fore of native title 
jurisprudence weighed down with the baggage of incomplete 
and piecemeal reasoning assembled over the last decade of 
determinations. 
The article begins with an overview of sea country claims. It 
then considers the difficulties faced by land and sea country 
claimants; discrete difficulties facing sea country claimants 
(particularly the element of ownership that title implies, which 
is ordinarily indicative of exclusive possession); and reviews 
the reasoning and consistency in native title case law. 
II  Overview of Sea Country Claims
Most native title claims in Australia are made over ‘land’. That 
is, the mainland or parts of islands which remain above the 
rise of tides. This type of claim may include sections of water, 
such as rivers flowing over the land. Areas which are covered 
transiently by water, like beaches, are called intertidal zones. 
The claim there is made to the solum, not to the water itself. 
The particular focus of this paper is claims to areas beyond 
the low-tide line; to put it simply, sea country. Sea country 
may be claimed along with adjacent terrestrial land, or it 
may be that only parts of the waterscape are claimed. Sea 
areas are occasionally particularised as land covered by a 
layer of ocean, similar to intertidal zones, in the hope that 
the distinction will result in being granted a broader range 
of rights. To make it easier for the reader, the labels I employ, 
in contradistinction, are ‘land’ (dry land) and ‘sea country’ 
(waters and seabeds). 
The Australian territory legally extends 12 nautical miles into 
the ocean (from the mean high water mark).1 This region is 
the ‘territorial sea’. Prior to 1990, the territory went out only 
to 3nm; that smaller moat around the nation is sometimes 
called our ‘coastal waters’. The baselines of the mainland and 
territorial sea are set in section 7 of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973 (Cth). Beyond the 12nm mark, out to 24 nm, 
is an area categorised on the Register of Native Title Claims 
as the ‘contiguous zone’. Beyond it is what the Register 
classes as the ‘exclusive economic zone’, extending out to 
200nm.2 Certain authors further distinguish between an 
inner territorial sea (State territory) and an outer territorial 
sea (Commonwealth).3 The area beyond the territorial 
sea is recognised as the ‘high seas’, a zone of international 
jurisdiction. In the unique case of the Torres Strait, Australia’s 
territorial seas are co-terminous with those of Papua New 
Guinea.4 Over a limited area of the Strait, Australia exercises 
jurisdiction over the water while PNG controls the sub-
adjacent seabed.5 The jurisdictional complexity of the 
seas around Australia has been a source of judicial brow-
furrowing. With this as the context, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the jurisprudence about sea country claims is also a 
cause for headache.
Native title is a customary Indigenous interest in land and/
or waters recognised by the common law. Recognition will 
take place when it is not an affront to the common law to 
recognise such an interest and where that interest has not 
been extinguished by another inconsistent interest, the 
granting or legal existence of which evinces a clear and 
plain intention not to tolerate continued enjoyment of native 
title (whether or not this other interest was ever applied in 
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practice). An interest in sea country finds particular difficulty 
in gaining recognition because: 
a) the proprietary nature of the interest, framed as native 
title, is an affront to the common law because exclusive 
possession of waters is difficult to conceive of and to 
reconcile with the common notions of real property and 
sea territory:
b) the historic and continuing treatment of waters by the 
Crown suggests that exclusive possession reposing in 
any other party would be inconsistent and unable to be 
enjoyed.
This article suggests that the apparent affront that 
interests in sea country represent is in fact a problem of 
conceptualisation. Exclusive possession of waters is not 
actually without precedent under the common law and is 
also tolerated within statutory proprietary rights. Moreover, 
the affront is avoided once one accepts that title to waters 
need not comprise the same ‘exclusive possession’ that we 
identify with freehold land rights. Exclusivity in regards 
to sea has always meant something watered down to 
accommodate public fishing and navigation, so this need not 
become a problem when one talks of exclusivity in waters 
in the specific context of native title. In addition, it must be 
remembered that ‘exclusive possession’ of land is similarly 
not as absolute as we may sometimes conceive it to be. In 
short, the first obstruction in the path to recognition has been 
the framing of sea country interests in the jurisprudence. This 
article also questions whether the historic and continuing 
treatment of sea country by the Crown is in fact (though 
more importantly in law) inconsistent with enjoyment of 
title by Indigenous claimants.
It is clear that sea country claims, whether correctly or not, 
have been seen as a particular problem in any land rights 
scheme. For instance, in his report on the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (‘ALRA’), John 
Reeves QC recommended disallowing claims to intertidal 
zones (let alone the granting of rights), and suggested a 
joint management approach to avoid claims over seas and 
seabeds.6 For different reasons the National Native Title 
Tribunal on its website provides separate maps and statistics 
for applications and Indigenous Land Use Agreements 
(‘ILUAs’) regarding sea country.7 Creating more concern, 
the Commonwealth Government recently passed the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Act 
2006 (Cth), which terminates land claims to foreshore land 
not contiguous with Aboriginal land, even where the Land 
Commissioner has recommended that the land be granted.8 
The litigation arising out of the claims of the Yarmirr people 
(Commonwealth v Yarmirr9 and Commonwealth v Yarmirr10) 
indicates that native title claims to both land and sea will 
not result in exclusive possession of the sea country portion. 
Rather, offshore rights will be limited and their non-
possessory nature emphasised. The following draft terms of 
a determination between parties appearing in a 2006 decision 
demonstrates the phrasing commonly used to explain 
offshore title:
That agreement confers exclusive rights on the [claimants] to 
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the land in the 
determination area to the exclusion of all others. The native 
title in relation to the water is a right to:
(a) hunt and fish in or on, and gather from, the water for 
the purpose of satisfying personal, domestic or non-
commercial communal needs; and
(b) take, use and enjoy the water for the purpose of 
satisfying personal, domestic or non-commercial 
communal needs.
The native title in relation to water does not confer upon the 
native title holders the right to possession, use or enjoyment 
of the water to the exclusion of others.11  
Before considering the judicial response to offshore native 
title, an outline of legislation relevant to interests in sea 
country is provided, along with details of the frequency 
of sea country claims. This is followed by an overview of 
important recent judgments.
A The Legislation
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’) is the main act 
governing Indigenous interests in land and waters. Section 
223 includes the familiar traditional interest/connection/
recognition formulation of native title. Further, section 6 
provides:
This Act extends to each external Territory, to the coastal sea 
of Australia and of each external Territory, and to any waters 
over which Australia asserts sovereign rights under the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973.
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Each state also has legislation providing mechanisms for 
recognition, or more often confirming non-recognition, of sea 
country interests for Aboriginal people. Statutory recognition 
of Indigenous traditional owners’ interests in sea country can 
come from one of three statutes in the Northern Territory: 
ALRA; the Aboriginal Land Act 1978 (NT) (‘Aboriginal Land 
Act’); and the Aboriginal Areas Protection Act 1987 (NT) (‘Areas 
Protection Act’). Under ALRA, transferred or granted coastal 
land extends to the low tide mark. However, this does not give 
control over the sea covering that intertidal zone. In Risk v 
Northern Territory12 it was held that seabeds could not be land 
claimed under ALRA. Section 12 of the Aboriginal Land Act 
provides for sea closures at the direction of the Administrator 
of the Northern Territory for sea adjoining and within 2km 
of Aboriginal land. The sea country becomes closed to 
[a]ny persons or class of persons, or for any purpose other 
than to Aboriginals who are entitled by Aboriginal tradition 
to enter and use those seas and who enter and use those seas 
in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.13
The legislation is directed mainly at creating a buffer zone 
to protect the possession and use of the land; its focus is not 
sea country rights. The closures provided by the Aboriginal 
Land Act are porous: commercial fishing licences current 
at the time of closure are exempt, as are renewals of those 
licences, which may take place up to six months after a 
license’s expiry. Although the right to access closed areas is 
not passed on when a person transfers or sells their license, 
corporations hold their licences effectively in perpetuity. 
Also, Navy vessels and Government personnel and supply 
boats for coastal communities are all allowed. Further, the sea 
closure does not give control to the Aboriginal community; 
all enforcement must be by way of reporting infringements 
to the police.14
In Queensland the seaward boundary of Aboriginal land 
is the high tide mark. Intertidal land may be gazetted as 
available for claim under the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Qld) 
but this has not yet occurred. Therefore, no access to control 
of saltwater resources currently exists.
In New South Wales the purpose of native title legislation 
is to validate ‘past acts’ and ‘intermediate past acts’ of non-
Indigenous people.15 In relation to sea country, section 17 
of the Native Title (New South Wales) Act 1994 (NSW) (‘NSW 
NTA’) states:
(1)  The existing ownership of all natural resources owned 
by the State is confirmed. 
(2)  All existing rights of the State to use, control and 
regulate the flow of water are confirmed. 
(3)  All existing fishing access rights under State law are 
confirmed to prevail over any other public or private 
fishing rights.
The legislation in South Australia is very similar to that 
existing in New South Wales. Section 39 of the Native Title 
(South Australia) Act 1994 (SA) (‘SA NTA’) replicates sections 
1-3 of the NSW NTA, but adds the following additional 
provisions: 
 (4)  Existing public access to and enjoyment of the 
following places is confirmed: 
(a) waterways; 
(b)  beds and banks or foreshores of waterways; 
(c)  coastal waters; 
(d)  beaches; 
(da)  stock-routes; 
(e)  areas that were public places at 31 December 
1993. 
(5)  Nothing in this section— 
(a)  extinguishes native title; or 
(b)  affects land or an interest in land held by 
Aboriginal peoples under a law that confers 
benefits only on Aboriginal peoples. 
The qualification in subsection (5)(a) is interesting in that it 
seems to construct the aforementioned rights (public access, 
Crown control over waterways, statutory fishing rights) 
as continuing without extinguishing native title in the sea 
country. This seems more obliging than the thinking of the 
judiciary, which finds that such rights certainly vitiate any 
exclusivity of title, which would have to be accepted as an 
important element in the make up of native title. 
Section 14 of the Native Title (Tasmania) Act 1994 (Tas) 
(‘Tasmanian NTA’) mirrors subsections (4) and (5) of the SA 
NTA, while section 14 of the Land Titles Validation Act 1994 
(Vic) replicates section 17 of the NSW NTA, but also includes 
in section 16 a qualification much like that in the SA NTA and 
Tasmanian NTA.
In Western Australia sections 13-14 of the Titles (Validation) 
and Native Title (Effect of Past Acts) Act 1995 (WA) give the 
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same confirmations as sections 1-4 of the SA NTA, but not 
that of that regarding non-extinguishment.
B The Statistics
It is almost universal in native title claims to sea country 
that some intertidal land is included: out of 90 applications 
registered on the Register of Native Title Claims at 30 June 
2006,16 89 claimed an intertidal zone. Roughly 74 percent 
also claimed a coastal zone. The proportion continued to 
drop zone by zone, and only six claims in 90 applied to sea 
country out in the exclusive economic zone: the Darumbal 
People and the Torres Strait Regional Sea Claim (Qld); the 
Esperance Nyungars; the Nyangumarta People; the Kariyarra 
People; and the Ngarla (WA). By September 2006, when 
updated data was published, there were 89 applications on 
this Register, 88 of which covered an intertidal zone. Again, 
6 claims covered part of the exclusive economic zone.17 The 
Schedule of Applications (Federal Court) and Determinations 
Including Sea Country at 30 June 200618 had a slightly higher 
total: 117 matters. Within these, the frequency of claims 
decreased relative to the distance from the coast, as it had on 
the Register above. Only eight claims reached as far out as 
the exclusive economic zone; they were the same six as listed 
above, plus two ‘not accepted’ claims: those of the Wom-
Ber (WA) and the West Arnhem Seas (NT). In all, 19 claims 
covered what may be termed ‘high seas’. At the September 
update, there were 118 matters, the addition being the as-yet 
untested South West Boojarah 2, which extends only to the 
intertidal zone.19
At June 2006 12 Federal Court applications already at the 
determination stage included sea country.20 None of those 
12 included country in the exclusive economic zone, though 
the Ngaluma/Injibandi claim includes contiguous zone sea 
country, and a further three include territorial sea.21 Three 
others include parts of the coastal zone.22 All 12 cover 
intertidal country. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that some 
relationship with sea country is felt by the applicants in a 
large proportion of claims, but that the majority of applicants 
are interested in a relatively narrow band of sea country. I say 
relatively as the intertidal zone in northern Australia is often 
many kilometres wide and is abundant in marine resources. 
Whether it means claimant groups have no particular interest 
in sea country further from the coast, or whether it reflects 
legal advice given to limit their claims to sea country closer 
to the shore is not revealed in the data. Certainly, sea claims 
have been cut from larger native title claims to improve the 
chance of success, including the first sea claim, which was 
within the original claim resulting in the Mabo v Queensland 
(No 2)23 decision. 
C Case Law
(i) Yarmirr (HCA)
In  this case the High Court heard an appeal against the 
finding of the Full Federal Court in Yarmirr (FFCA),  itself 
having been an appeal against the decision of Olney J of the 
Federal Court.24 The claim was the first to exclusively involve 
rights to sea country.25 The claimants sought recognition 
of exclusive possession, ownership, occupation, use and 
enjoyment of certain sea, seabed and resources in the Croker 
Island region. Justice Olney found native title in those areas, 
but did not confer exclusive rights on the title holders. 
The critical findings of the High Court were:
The common law does extend beyond the low water 
mark, but not into the high seas.
The public rights of navigation and fishing are such that 
title in the claimed waters would be encumbered. This 
led to the conclusion that the native title claimed was 
unable to be recognised because exclusivity created an 
inconsistency. A selection of particularised rights was 
granted in lieu; a selection of rights which had been 
found to exist during the factual inquiry.26
Exclusivity was the crucial issue. When the concept of title 
cannot be made manifest (as here), elements of traditional 
law are translated into particularised rights (particularised 
but not precisely defined). Similar ‘non-exclusive’ rights to 
sea country were later granted in Sampi v Western Australia.27 
This is not equivalent to title being recognised in a reduced 
or modified form, as the rights are given in an exhaustive list 
and provide no residual or transcending interest in the way 
native title does. Moreover, these rights empower individual 
subjects, whereas native title is a communal holding. It is for 
these reasons that I contend that, implicit in the High Court’s 
reasoning in Yarmirr (HCA), is the notion that native title 
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(ii) The Lardil Peoples v Queensland28
This case involved a claim to the waters around the Wellesley 
Islands in the Gulf of Carpentaria. Behrendt points out that 
it was only the second claim after Yarmirr (FCA) relating 
to areas below the high water mark without involving an 
onshore portion.29 The rights recognised were:
native title to intertidal zones and adjoining waters 
extending between 2.7 and 5nm, depending on whether 
the adjoining land was occupied at sovereignty;
rights to fish, hunt and gather living and plant resources 
in those set waters;
rights to access land and waters below the high tide 
for religious and spiritual purposes allowed under 
traditional law and custom. 
(iii) Gumana (on behalf of the Yarrwidi Gumatj and other 
groups) v Northern Territory30
Relevant to the present discussion is the claim raised by the 
plaintiffs in Gumana (FCA) for dry land, an intertidal zone 
and adjacent sea. Some intertidal zones and dry land had 
been granted to Aboriginal people as a fee simple under 
ALRA. Justice Selway found:
the applicants had a native title right of exclusive 
possession over the land but not the intertidal zone;
the native title rights were ‘similar to those identified in 
Yarmirr … as further explained in Lardil Peoples’.31
After comprehensive reasoning Selway J found that: 
If the issue were free from authority then in my view the 
grant of a statutory fee simple to the low water mark would 
abrogate the public rights to fish and navigate in the inter-
tidal zone.32
However, in Yarmirr (FCA), the trial judge had not understood 
the foreshore (intertidal zone) to come within the grant of 
exclusive possession.33 It is that authority which Selway J 
had in mind. Risk v Northern Territory34 treated Yarmirr (HCA) 
as having left open the question of intertidal zone rights, but 
in Gumana (FCA) Selway J decided that Yarmirr (FFCA) was 
binding in regards to intertidal zone rights.35 His Honour 
held that exclusive rights to control access to intertidal zones 
are not a corollary of the grant of a fee simple. Further, the 






particularly not free-flowing water.36As a result, the statutory 
fee simple over the intertidal zone was not able to found a 
native title right of exclusive possession for the claimants. 
(iv) Gumana v Northern Territory37  
In Gumana (FFCA) French, Finn and Sundberg JJ overturned 
Selway J’s decision in Gumana (FCA) and held that freehold 
land granted under ALRA does carry with it exclusive rights 
regarding commercial fishing in intertidal zones and in tidal 
rivers over that land. Their Honours asked whether the grant 
in fee simple excluded any subsisting public right to fish in 
the intertidal zone, answering the question thus:
But for the joint judgment of Beaumont and von Doussa JJ 
in Yarmirr FC, Selway J would have answered this question 
favourably to the appellants. Because of that decision, his 
Honour held that the fee simple grant did not confer on 
the Land Trust a right to exclude from the waters of the 
inter-tidal zone persons exercising public rights to fish or 
to navigate. His Honour also considered that such persons 
were not so excluded by s 70 of the Land Rights Act and that 
Yarmirr FC dictated this conclusion: Gumana 141 FCR at [80], 
[85] and [87]. The correctness of Yarmirr FC is in issue on the 
appeal as are the above conclusions which stemmed from 
that decision.38 
Their Honours then expressed the opinion that the decision 
of the Full Court in Yarmirr (FFCA) was ‘plainly wrong’.39 
This clear and sequential discussion of the jurisprudence, 
combined with the apparent willingness to independently 
evaluate the correctness of the Yarmirr suite of litigation is 
to be welcomed. Nevertheless, given the Northern Territory’s 
decision to appeal to the High Court against the finding in 
Gumana (FFCA), it is necessary to reserve definitive judgment 
until a decision granting or denying special leave is made.  
(v) Risk (HCA)40   
Risk (HCA) arose out of a string of appeals concerning whether 
an application under ALRA could be made to claim certain 
seabeds under Northern Territory waters. At first instance 
the Aboriginal Land Commissioner held the seabed was not 
‘land’ for the purposes of ALRA.41 His view was endorsed by 
the majority of the Federal Court bench, then unanimously 
in the High Court.42 
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(vi) Griffiths v Northern Territory43
Griffiths affirms that Yarmirr (HCA) determined that no 
native title right to exclusive possession can exist over tidal 
waters.44 The pleadings suggest that non-tidal waters can be 
under exclusive possession. This is not out of step with the 
long history of the law, but does seem difficult to manage 
in situations where the waters form a river which is both 
tidal and non-tidal, as in this instance, as access to the tidal 
parts must remain unrestricted. Justice Weinberg seems 
of the opinion that any common law ‘property’ in flowing 
water is really property in the land under that water. Also, 
the decision considers the common law rights to fish and to 
freely navigate, deciding that the right to fish need not be 
limited only to those waters which are navigable; in effect, 
the two rights are not coextensive.45
III Difficulties Faced by Land and Sea Country 
Claimants
A Removal from Land
Forced removals are a key issue in native title jurisprudence. 
Physical separation and general changes in custom are 
problematic as connection to the land must be proven to 
establish the existence of native title.46 However, it appears 
this has had less effect in sea country regions because they 
were subject to less interference. This is borne out in the 
Living on Saltwater Country report, which notes that ‘northern 
Aboriginal populations … were not physically dispossessed 
by waves of new settlers to the same extent’.47 In the case of 
the Torres Strait there was, by contrast, an influx of European 
settlers working in fisheries and the pearl shell industry, 
although Island men were engaged to work for the companies 
which enabled them to continue to live in the region and 
visit its islands.48 There were other areas where movement 
away from coastal settlements disturbed interaction with sea 
country, but in Gumana (FCA), for instance, it was noted that 
despite relocation to a mission south of Blue Mud Bay, many 
Indigenous locals returned to their country in spare time. 
It was held that their connection remained during times of 
physical absence. 
B Mistranslation
It has been difficult in both onshore and offshore claims 
for courts to articulate rights which properly translate the 
relationships between Indigenous people and country.49 
Not only are customary conceptions of proprietary interests 
very different, but the spiritual rationale behind Indigenous 
law is also foreign to the common law’s concepts. Peterson 
notes that, ‘[p]articularly where the issue of property rights 
are concerned, [the law] has difficulties with the open-
ended, decentred, continuously negotiable indeterminacies 
of Aboriginal discourse’.50 One of the central reasons for 
claiming native title is to protect a spiritual interrelation with 
land and enable native title holders to fulfil a sense of spiritual 
responsibility for land. It is unfortunate that the very process 
by which Indigenous people must seek to have their title 
recognised seems inherently incapable of emphasising the 
depth of that spiritual aspect. In Hayes v Northern Territory51 
Olney J warned that ‘any form of native title which did not 
recognise the need to protect sacred and significant sites would 
debase the whole concept of traditional rights in relation to 
land’.52 Personally, I am unconvinced that claimant groups 
feel that this is a useful warning so much as a description of 
the way the system already operates. The boundaries of sea 
interests are also suffering in translation. This appears partly 
due to the reduced awareness of physical landmarks in the 
sea, but also because of a dearth of principles. In Lardil, the 
extent of a right ‘as far as the eye could see’ was ‘translated’ 
as 5nm. Mistranslation is a more acute problem when sea 
country interests are the subject of a claim, as discussed later 
in the paper. 
C What Does ‘Access To Use or Protect Sacred 
Sites’ Mean?
Yarmirr (HCA) suggests that offshore rights can be put no 
higher than rights to access and protect sacred sites for 
purposes existing in traditional laws and customs (and to 
fish and hunt on a non-commercial scale).53 Some onshore 
claims are also expressed in that way. These rights already 
seem to be addressed by heritage legislation. What is not clear 
from judgments is what the nature of such rights actually is. 
To what extent can right-bearers control access to and use 
of a site by non-clan members to ensure it is not harmed? 
Proper maintenance of traditional sites (both physically 
and spiritually) would appear to require a very high level 
of control, verging on exclusive possession. However, 
exclusive access to sacred sea sites has been rejected in native 
title claims (though heritage rights theoretically stop people 
entering some sites).54 Therefore, the difficulty is greater in 
offshore claims where the recognition of a right to protect 
sites sits uncomfortably with the disallowance of exclusive 
use/control. 
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The reasoning in Yarmirr (HCA) appears to import a very 
strict reading of ‘ownership’ into a claim for native title over 
waters. Ownership of sea country (importing the notions of 
control and exclusivity pertaining to ownership of land) is 
simply not part of the common law. Rather than working 
through the difficulty of translating Indigenous water 
rights, thereby  developing a specific water-based common 
law interest, the High Court rather bluntly dismissed the 
claim because ownership cannot be affixed to water. This 
illustrates the attempt to claim a right which is ‘awkwardly 
extracted from Western doctrines which have distinctly 
different conceptual backgrounds’.55 
If a narrow reading is taken of the right to protect sacred 
sites, it would seem that other rights relating to sacred 
sites may not be recognised. These fall into a category 
which Brennan CJ (as he then was) loosely termed ‘non-
accessory rights’.56 It is clear that the judiciary has not yet 
plumbed the depths of possible rights which relate neither 
to access (‘accessory rights’) or to protection of sacred sites 
(a specific usufructuary right, in my opinion). Indigenous 
relationships to sea country are not restricted to physical 
access to specific sites. 57 They are part of a cosmology and 
a ‘saltwater’ identity.58 Further, title to marine resources is 
sought by Indigenous groups as the foundation of economic 
independence, as Woodward first reported some 30 years 
ago.59 This cannot be realised given the limited rights 
granted. Procuring rent from leased sea country would be 
another way title could provide economic empowerment, a 
goal which currently is only given lip service in Indigenous 
policy, as Strelein notes.60
(i) Rights to exclude tourism?
As tourism grows offshore, it is possible to imagine boat 
loads of tourists being shipped to a reef formation to sightsee 
during Aboriginal practices or ceremonies. The use of such 
areas for tourism may well offend people who hold that 
reef to be sacrosanct or who recognise a code of gendered 
access, as was pleaded in relation to a men’s religious site in 
Sampi.61 Rights to protect and use sites may not be infringed, 
if no physical harm results and if Indigenous people are not 
restricted in their ability to use the particular reef. Only 
Kirby J, in his dissent in Yarmirr (HCA), suggested that 
claimants may have the right to exclude people engaging 
in tourism.62 It is common for Aboriginal communities to 
traditionally require visitors to seek permission to enter 
areas, not because of proprietary control but to avoid people 
without the requisite knowledge coming onto sacred sites 
and thereby provoking disastrous consequences for that 
society.63 A right acknowledging the sacredness of sites but 
not empowering title-holders to restrict other people from 
entry cannot fully protect the sacred nature of those sites. 
The Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 
(NT) makes it an offence to enter, work on, or desecrate a 
registered sacred site, including marine sites. However, this 
is not authority for traditional owners to manage sacred sea 
country, and there have been reports of unwanted access 
continuing regardless of registration. Effective patrolling 
of access points to sea country is logistically very difficult 
and the weaker or smaller the right, the harder it is to 
devote resources to its enforcement and to stamp it on the 
consciousness of other seafarers. In Queensland there is 
an EPA registry of heritage sites, but none are Aboriginal 
sea country sites.64 Further, the NTA right to negotiate over 
permissible future acts, a powerful mechanism for registered 
claimant groups, is not operative in circumstances of 
damaging offshore future acts, or offshore acts retrospectively 
declared permissible future acts.65 Again, it is clear that only 
very limited legal mechanisms exist. More symbolically, in 
the politics of recognition, it is apparent that Indigenous 
spirituality is open to denigration and abuse because of the 
dearth of effective legal mechanisms to protect against the 
potentially nefarious impact of tourism. 
(ii) Rights of access over sea country
Many sea sites for which protection rights have been 
granted may not be accessible without crossing water in 
which native title has been found not to exist. Regarding 
the Wellesley Islands, Behrendt notes, ‘[i]t would have been 
thought that a right of access across those waters would 
have at least been recognised’.66 Does a right of access to 
sites include some sort of right of way over those other 
waters? To pin it down legally, is this a derivative right? Or 
is it enough for Indigenous people to rely on the public right 
of free navigation (remembering it may not be public water 
that one has to cross). A comparison with the hypothetical 
situation of a homeowner who has a battleaxe property, but 
whose conveyancing documents and LTO registration forget 
to mention an access driveway, is a useful heuristic. Equity 
may imply a right of access in the form of an easement. 
Could this easement be recognised or registered if a previous 
case had explicitly held that the front block was the exclusive 
property of its owners and not of the battleaxe owners, 
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on top of the implicit exclusive possession that the front 
property owners enjoy with their fee simple? The answer 
would seem to be yes. However, if the scenario were not two 
neighbouring homeowners but the Sovereign and a native 
title holder, neither of whose ownership is based on garden-
variety property law, can some sort of analogous easement 
exist to cross water to a protected site? This is not yet clear, on 
the authorities. Griffiths touches on whether possession of a 
riverbed creates apparently derivative control rights relating 
to waters but does not advance the jurisprudence. 
D Tenure
Hepburn argues, rather convincingly, that the system of feudal 
tenure was never organic or well-suited to the Australian 
context. She would rather see an allodial system, as ‘native 
title cannot evolve within a common law framework that 
regards ownership as a derivative of the English Crown’.67 
The counter-argument is that Mabo (No 2)’s finding that 
radical title, rather than full beneficial title, was reposed in 
the Crown obviates problems of tenure. All putative native 
title would have been extinguished, on the High Court’s 
analysis, if beneficial title had been reposed in the Crown 
since sovereignty. However, the running of offshore claims 
has demonstrated that radical tenure remains a hurdle. 
Most sea country has not been granted to other settlers by 
way of freehold, pastoral lease, or Crown grant. No title 
exists over sea other than that which common law deems 
to have existed at sovereignty, (which apparently involves 
only radical title). However, claims are failing during the 
inquiry into extinguishment. The type of title reposed in the 
Crown is being considered in such a way that an exclusive 
native title could not co-exist. The question of how title 
could be recognised to fit around other rights is not being 
asked and a more profound inquiry into extinguishment 
involving clarifying the Crown interest and exactly what 
the claimed rights entail is not being reached. The prevailing 
view appears to be that Crown title in sea country is prima 
facie sufficient to extinguish native title. The acquisition of 
waters upon sovereignty, or in some cases a later assertion of 
sovereignty, becomes the extinguishing act. This retrograde 
operation parallels the way in which beneficial title was once 
held to quash native title under the terra nullius doctrine.
No matter how sea claims are characterised, it seems, they 
will be defeated by the radical title, and at most a mix of 
ersatz public rights and heritage legislation rights granted. 
This supports Hepurn’s comment that even ‘within the 
radical tenure system, native title has effectively become an 
estranged misfit’.68
E Enforcement of Control 
Formal and onerous expectations of enforcement of control 
over (entry onto) land are difficult, and stem from an 
uneffaced common law view regarding what constitutes 
land ownership and how a land owner would behave. 
This is exacerbated offshore because of the actual logistical 
difficulties in exercising control over people coming on 
to expanses of water; and the waters themselves, which 
necessarily shift out of the claimed area. Peterson has argued 
that ‘asking or letting the appropriate people know where 
one is going is the fleeting and virtually invisible day-to-day 
social expression of the system of sea tenure’.69
Justice Callinan in Yarmirr (HCA) went so far as to require 
that claimants prove they could enforce their own land laws 
against non-Indigenous persons before those laws could be 
recognised. This was an almost impossible burden to meet, 
and seemed arbitrarily imposed in sea claims. Enforcement is 
usually the result of a law’s recognition of a right, not the test 
of a law’s legality or legitimacy in granting that right. Happily, 
the success of such enforcement was legally irrelevant in the 
eyes of other judges, so this added burden is not imposed. 
IV Discrete Difficulties Facing Sea Country 
Claimants
Behrendt is alluding to discrete difficulties now faced in 
sea country claims when he notes that Lardil ‘highlight[s] 
the deficiencies in Yarmirr’.70 Yarmirr (HCA) dealt with (and 
sometimes created) the particular hurdles in the path of a sea 
country claim. This section teases out the pertinent issues in 
these variegated strains of difficulty. 
A Exclusivity
Yarmirr (HCA) affirmed that exclusive possession cannot be 
recognised offshore. In Australia’s system of property law, an 
owner’s freehold title is characterised by exclusive rights over 
land. On an abstract level, an exclusive right granted to a third 
party defeats native title in that land because exclusivity, by 
nature, cannot be shared or divided. However, it has since 
been recognised  that less-than-complete native title may exist 
as the remainder left once the ‘extent of the inconsistency’ has 
(2007)  11(2)  A ILR 63
extinguished any rights in its path. This remainder may be 
title, implying exclusivity (the Wik Peoples v Queensland71 line), 
or it may be an exhaustive list of non-exclusive rights instead 
of title (as in Yarmirr (HCA)). The sovereign’s prerogative 
powers are limited by customary navigation and fishing 
rights.72 As all proprietary rights in Australia derive from 
the rights of the sovereign, any ownership of sea country 
cannot be so exclusive as to oust navigation and fishing 
rights. This makes governments sensitive about granting 
exclusive offshore native title, as it may seem to give more 
that could be granted to non-Indigenous people. Further, it 
was implied in Gumana (FFCA) that exclusive rights cannot 
be granted because moving waters are akin to atmosphere or 
airspace above land.73 The opprobrious implications of this 
governmental insensitivity are evident in the Queensland and 
Commonwealth Government’s doggedly litigious approach 
to the Lardil claim, even though ‘the State of Queensland 
accepted that native title existed in the claim area’.74 
There is also a less political difficulty derived from the 
operation of native title as a body of law recognised by the 
common law. Behrendt suggests that non-recognition
is a product of inappropriate approaches to determining 
inconsistency between native title and other interests and the 
difficulty Australian courts have in translating Aboriginal 
laws and customs into native title rights and interests.75 
The common law does not often entitle subjects to exclusive 
rights to sea country. Under the common law all rights 
currently exercised on or in relation to the sea could not be 
complementary with an exclusive right in that area. Even 
when exclusivity is not explicitly claimed, the litigated claims 
process draws attention to exclusivity because it is an expected 
point of tension and tends towards translating rights claimed 
as exclusive rights. It essentialises native title as exclusive in 
character, and exclusive in a fashion inherently incompatible 
with any others’ sea rights. Justice Olney found as a fact in 
Yarmirr (FCA) that traditional rights did not include a right to 
exclusive possession. This should suggest that the claimants 
were not attempting to claim proprietary exclusivity. This 
indicates a fundamental problem of conceptualisation 
regarding claims to sea country. By framing such claims as 
essentially claims to ersatz freehold, the judiciary imposes an 
implicit handicap on Indigenous claims to sea country. 
It is suggested that the sui generis nature of native title rights is 
an additional stumbling block to sea country claims because of 
the inherent conceptual difficulty in fashioning rights outside 
of the traditional ambit of property law. The judiciary’s mettle 
is tested when claimants submit that the non-proprietary 
nature of native title rights should in fact transcend the 
options established in property law. If native title rights and 
interests were characterised in a less rigid manner, they could 
be less inherently ill-suited to a test of inconsistency. In The 
Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakay Native Title Claim Group 
v Northern Territory76 Mansfield J opined: 
I do not consider it inconsistent with such rights [pastoral 
lease-holder rights] that the native title right to control access 
to land should survive to exclude persons who might wish to 
enter the land to do things unrelated to the pastoral lease or 
without some other reserved or statutory rights [these being 
the potential sources of extinguishment].77
What Mansfield J outlines is not quite the doctrine of 
suppression of native title that may be extracted from Wik, 
because the title does not lie nascent. Instead, he is allowing 
native title to exist as an interest from which others’ rights 
are carved. These carved-out rights may be permanent, but 
theoretically could also be temporary and merely suppress 
that portion of native title in the way adumbrated in Wik. 
There is much to be said for this conceptualisation. It is not 
as absolutist as the approach taken in Yarmirr (HCA), such 
that one element of inconsistency here would not bring down 
completely and forever the prospect of native title. But it is 
also not a ‘bundle of rights’ approach, which can breed in 
weakness because it limits rights to those particularised. 
It is suggested that the ‘holistic and integrated nature 
of Aboriginal interests in Australia’s northern marine 
environments’78 makes a segregated bundle of rights an 
inappropriate option. 
The Living on Saltwater Country report stated that the 
complexity of Indigenous peoples’ relationships to sea 
country is ‘in many ways similar, or possibly identical, to 
that between Aboriginal people and land’.79 While this is 
a sensible comparison, it should not be used to stunt the 
development of sea country jurisprudence. Simply because 
a bundle approach has been used in relation to land rights 
does not mean it is an appropriate approach to sea rights (or 
indeed that it was a good choice in the land rights scenario). 
In Mabo (No 2) Brennan J (as he then was) suggested that 
the aversion to recognising exclusive native title in sea 
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country might be because non-exclusivity of water rights is a 
‘skeleton principle’ of our legal system, and as such improper 
to overturn.80 With respect, I cannot agree. Water rights, 
while significant, are hardly inviolable cornerstones of the 
common law. McIntyre subsumes navigation rights within 
the broader right to freedom of movement.81 This framing 
suggests that the boney core of the law is not under threat 
when sea country claims run into public navigation rights. 
B Extinguishment
In terrestrial land claims extinguishment occurs on a legal, 
not a factual level. This is because the freeholder’s exclusive 
right to land leaves no room for any other title. There is no 
chance of a competing fee simple in most sea country, and 
yet the battle seems stricter, and more abstract. The public 
right to navigate is held conceptually unable to co-exist with 
exclusive, or full, native title, despite the fact that a right 
to navigate is in no way as expansive as an exclusive right 
to control. In so far as the rights to navigate and to fish are 
common law creatures they are vulnerable to abridgment by 
statute, in the normal course of legal reasoning. This reading 
was affirmed in Gumana (FFCA). Native title is a creation of 
statute, and therefore should be able to abrogate conflicting 
public rights. However, the Australian judiciary has not 
welcomed this sort of prioritisation.
Indeed, it seems that the conceptual battle has reached a level 
of theory so abstract that almost any two rights are unable to 
co-exist. Alternatively, a claim for native title is not a claim 
for freehold estate. While the broad rights of freehold cannot 
tolerate other rights including native title; native title need 
not be unable to tolerate other rights.  
The readiness to extinguish based on mutually exclusive 
rights can be attacked from another angle. Freehold persists 
in other (intertidal) situations even when that same right 
to navigate seeks to overlay itself.82 Behrendt bolsters this 
common sense argument with some case examples:83
Lord Advocate v Young84: ‘possession of the foreshore … 
can never be, in the strict sense of the term, exclusive’.
Mace v Philcox85: an owner’s title in foreshore was strong 
enough to successfully sue for trespass even though 
public navigation rights existed there. 
Gumana (FFCA) adds that at common law the foreshore 
belongs prima facie to the Crown but can ‘be made subject 
•
•
of private ownership’.86 The enumerated cases above also 
involve the public right to fish, similarly unthreatening 
to the property owners (successfully) purporting to have 
excusive title. Justice Kirby dissented in Yarmirr (HCA) in 
acknowledging that ‘exclusive’ titles over dry land may be 
subject to public access rights, and that the common law 
right to fish ceases in sea areas where there are proprietary 
rights, like aquaculture leases.87 Country with a foreshore 
may be held exclusively while others’ rights to navigate and 
to fish exist over that land, yet sea country cannot be held 
exclusively because of the existence of these same rights. 
Moreover, de facto exclusive possession of the sea is allowed 
to others. As Gaskin has noted, the ‘long lines’ set up under 
pearling leases in actuality exclude all public navigators and 
Indigenous claimants from passing through. As she puts it, 
the sea becomes ‘physically appropriated space and legally 
expropriated country’.88 Thus, while native title need not 
result in such public exclusion, it will not even be recognized 
over sea country, yet leases which in practice do create strict 
exclusive use and control are readily granted.
This illustrates a difference in the way that Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous rights are protected. It is contended that this 
sort of discriminatory approach to the exercise of a right is 
within the purview of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
(‘RDA’).89 That native title is unable to gain legal exclusivity 
when encumbered by navigation rights, while other title is 
exclusive despite the same encumbrance, shows a differential 
treatment of land rights that, by definition and also by effect, 
disadvantages only Indigenous people. In this way, it is a 
racially-founded discrimination.90
This leads to the conclusion that if freehold retains its 
exclusive nature, despite coexisting navigation rights, then it 
cannot reasonably be claimed that native title must fail to gain 
recognition because navigation rights render it unable to be 
labelled exclusive. Moreover, it should not be extinguished 
because of an inconsistency presumed to arise out of any 
claimed exclusivity, because exclusivity is not, even on a 
conceptual level, inconsistent with others’ navigation and 
public fishing rights in other cases.
C What Extinguishing Act?
Whose power is it to extinguish native title because of public 
rights? Certainly Parliament, with legislation, may extinguish 
common law rights but the NTA is empty on that issue in 
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regards to sea claims. The rights to navigate and to fish 
are not prerogative grants. They are both recognised by the 
common law, one sourced from international law, and one 
from the fictional ‘time whereof there is no memory to the 
contrary’. They are not statutory creations and are amenable 
to abrogation by the legislature.91 Statutory fishing rights, 
under licenses, override public rights. As a point of law, it is 
unclear how these public rights operate to extinguish native 
title, being neither inconsistent Crown grants nor a use of 
the prerogative (not that this could be used to deny native 
title92). Sea-use licenses (such as those granting pearling or 
fishing rights) are obviously restricted and impermanent, and 
clearly not exclusive because of the legal meaning of a license 
in contradistinction to leases or freeholds. I would suggest 
that licenses would struggle to extinguish native title, much 
as farming licenses (pastoral leases) have struggled.
D Clash with International Rights
International law can be enforced in international 
jurisdictions. However, to be enforced within the domestic 
jurisdiction, that law must be ratified into Australian 
legislation, have direct effect, or be recognised by the 
common law. In the case of sea country claims, the native 
title holders’ purported right conflicts to some limited 
extent with the international right to navigate freely through 
those waters. For instance, in the Wellesley Islands claim, 
evidence was put that claimants considered themselves to 
have a right to stop boats passing through their country.93 
There does not seem a particular, principled reason why 
an international law right should trump an Indigenous 
law right in the contest for recognition. However, that 
is clearly the way the conflict is to be resolved, following 
Yarmirr (HCA). Kaye notes that ‘[t]o remain compliant 
with international law, a state may have to dilute or even 
negate indigenous rights over offshore areas’.94 To have 
exclusive control over a sea area may require a sea closure 
(see NTA and ALRA). According to Kaye closing off access 
in territorial seas contravenes Part 11, Article 3 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’).95 
However, it cannot be said that Australian policy is overly 
concerned about compliance with international covenants. 
Similarly, the High Court is not quick to cite international 
law as a reason why a right cannot be exercised under 
domestic law. The concern in native title seems to be with 
upsetting the common law which recognises a right, rather 
than upsetting any international body of law from which 
the right arises. 
In Wik Kirby J said:
[t]he theory accepted by this Court in Mabo [No 2] was 
not that the native title of indigenous Australians was 
enforceable of its own power or by legal techniques akin 
to the recognition of foreign law. It was that such title was 
enforceable in Australian courts because the common law in 
Australia said so.96 
This apparently negatives my earlier contention that both 
types of recognised rights are equivalent. However, in the 
context of that judgement, it appears that Kirby J is articulating 
the way in which native title differs from international law in 
the absence of a ratification process. 
More importantly, if the exercise of a right which is 
purporting to extinguish native title in offshore areas is the 
exercise of an international right reposed in individuals then 
it is not an explicit act of government. It would appear that 
the doctrine of radical title as opposed to beneficial title is 
that extinguishment of native title can only occur off the back 
of an inconsistent sovereign act evincing a clear and plain 
intention to extinguish.97 As discussed, sea country may 
not be under radical title whereas land is, but the judicially-
developed notion of extinguishment has not been, and 
need not be, replaced. Perhaps the sovereign act, then, is 
the common law’s act of recognising a right of navigation, 
but this is a very loose application of what it means to act. 
To view this as the sovereign acting via the common law 
is artificial. Moreover, the removal of a right is generally 
exercised by the legislature, not the judiciary. And even if the 
right were not reposed only in individuals, the sovereign’s 
prerogative powers are limited by customary navigation and 
fishing rights.98 It is for this reason that any ‘ownership’ of 
sea country by the Crown or derived from the Crown’s title 
cannot be so exclusive as to exclude public navigation and 
fishing rights. Therefore, if a grant of native title purported 
to go beyond that limit of sovereign power, it might be ultra 
vires and need to be read down rather than being held as 
absolutely exclusive and therefore as inconsistent.
V  Reviewing the Reasoning and Consistency in 
Native Title Case Law
A Legal not Factual Extinguishment
A disenchanting feature of native title determinations is 
the legal, rather than factual, nature of the enquiry into 
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extinguishment. However, it seems that this legal focus has 
misguidedly been used as a basis in sea country matters 
for further limiting claimants’ success. Justice Gaudron 
noted, during the hearing of Yarmirr (HCA), that native title 
cannot be claimed in a manner that requires a finding square 
kilometre by square kilometre, which appeared to presume 
that the factual circumstances of each square kilometre 
would otherwise be put in issue rather than simply put in 
evidence.99 Her concern seems to be that one area of water 
may be subject to native title while an adjacent, ostensibly 
identical patch is not. It was for fear of uncertainty, or at least 
fear of a complicated result, that she would not sustain the 
submission that fishing licenses need not have extinguished 
title. However, this seems to misunderstand how the legal 
enquiry is constructed. In asking whether there is a legal 
inconsistency of rights, the nature of the common law/
statutory right is compared with the purported Indigenous 
right. The location and content of that right is shaped by 
the facts of the claimant group’s customs. This problem of 
perception may be exacerbated because Western culture 
does not articulate the same nuanced changes between parts 
of the sea. However, the untrained Western eye also cannot 
discern a difference between a pastoral lease paddock and 
a neighbouring freehold paddock, because the difference is 
legal not physical. That differing legal status seems arbitrary 
to lay people cannot be a reason for disallowing rights. 
Further, that the ‘uncertain’ division seems more obvious on 
an open body of water should not be accepted as a relevant or 
principled reason for being more constricted in sea country 
claims than land claims.
Additionally, when the common law or statutory right is not 
absolute in nature (again, take the pastoral lease example) it 
becomes relevant to look at the factual operation of the two 
rights to determine whether an inconsistency arises. This 
inquiry may even need to be made on numerous occasions, 
if the Wik doctrine of suppression applies, to check whether 
the suppression is lifted as circumstances change. Therefore, 
it will always be that Indigenous interests will need to be 
assessed square kilometre by square kilometre.
B The ‘Skeleton Principle’ Test
The reasoning in Yarmirr seems to replace the ‘fracturing the 
skeletal principle’ test100 with a more onerous test requiring 
claimants to establish that no inconsistency would exist at all, 
rather than merely establishing that the inconsistency would 
not be undermining the skeleton principle, or if it were, that 
it is nevertheless justified.101  The skeletal principle idea 
was set up as a test of proportionality. However, the balance 
between benefits and harms seems rarely to be assessed. 
Before Yarmirr (HCA) there was little opportunity to assess 
whether reform of the undeniably fundamental concept of 
tenure could be justified because of the benefits it would 
allow in reconciling Indigenous law and the common law,102 
not to mention the bolstering effect this would have on 
another fundamental principle, that of equality before the 
law.103 One aspect of Yarmirr (HCA) that is consistent with 
authorities is the way it jumps over any consideration of 
proportionality.104  
C Handling Bundles of Rights
In Western Australia v Ward105 the High Court characterised 
native title as involving a bundle of rights, whereas Yarmirr 
(HCA) can be interpreted as supporting an indivisible 
conceptualisation of native title. Yarmirr (HCA) is not 
watertight authority on the (in)correctness of the bundle 
of rights approach as it presents title as indivisible rather 
than an agglomerated ‘bundle’. Howden suggests there is 
a tension between Yarmirr (HCA) and Ward as to whether 
protecting cultural knowledge of the land can be a burden 
on radical title.106 Claimants must be very careful to establish 
the nature of rights claimed; if exclusivity is found as a fact 
not to be part of the traditional laws this cannot be appealed. 
Further, claimants should ensure all other aspects of their 
relationships to sea country are comprehensively expressed, 
otherwise this non-exclusivity may suggest to the bench that 
a limited bundle of rights is all that is needed to recognise 
the traditional role of the country, or worse, a limited list of 
rights. But also, if the fact finding reveals exclusivity as a 
tenet of the tradition and custom, claimants will want to be 
wary of running their submissions in a way that suggests 
to the bench that the title sought will not be worth granting 
unless exclusive, as exclusivity is bound to overshadow the 
claim and ultimately very unlikely to be recognised.
If, on the evidence, exclusivity was not a feature of traditional 
laws, as was found to be the case in Yarmirr (FCA), does this 
mean it should not be when formulated into Australian 
law? It may still be that to translate the traditional rights 
requires the auxiliary element of exclusivity, which was 
simply unnecessary under Indigenous law when there were 
no non-Indigenous peoples challenging the interests to sea 
country. Unfortunately, the path by which Olney J arrived 
at his finding that exclusivity was not a traditional right is 
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‘not clear’.107 It is therefore difficult to determine how claims 
should be framed in the future. 
D Crown Title, and the Leviathan Lurking in the 
Deep
The reasoning on sea country and land claims seems 
inconsistent regarding the royal prerogative. That the 
prerogative power may deny Indigenous land rights was 
rejected in Mabo (No 2). Our system does not confer absolute 
beneficial title on the Crown, only radical title. Further, 
Yarmirr (HCA) recognises that a common law public right 
to navigate and fish is inconsistent with an absolute Crown 
title, in the intertidal zones at least. Yet the indivisible notion 
of native title, and the finding that it cannot co-exist with the 
type of rights currently held in the sea, even though those 
in question are neither freehold title nor de facto rights 
manifesting some Crown use, suggests that Crown title is 
in fact asserted in an absolute form.108 The ambiguity is 
heightened by reasoning that presumes radical title is absent 
from the sea and the seabed.109 The Crown ‘interest’ seems 
to be authority, as yet unexercised, to legislate in respect of 
waters and to grant to others ownership or lesser proprietary 
rights. An internationally-recognised right of ownership by 
coastal states has long been inconsistent with the right of 
innocent passage.110 
In Yarmirr (HCA) the Court inquired into the types of rights 
and interests that were asserted at sovereignty over the 
territorial sea. It was held that the pertinent sovereign actions 
‘did not amount to an assertion of ownership to or radical 
title in respect of the sea-bed or super-adjacent sea in that 
area, whether as a matter of international law or of municipal 
law’.111 This leaves uncertain the precise ambit of the 
sovereign interest obtained by the Crown upon colonisation. 
Jurisprudence explores what the sovereign interest is not, 
but what is still unclear is whether this elusive interest is 
more or less powerful than radical title. The majority in 
Yarmirr (HCA) firmly avoided this interrogation.112 It is 
submitted this is the chasm into which much offshore title 
jurisprudence is unwittingly falling, for without a clear-cut 
interest against which to contrast claims for title, the foci of 
title determinations are not aligned to one course and rely 
upon reacting to whatever conceptual cohesion exists across 
the claims. 
VI Conclusion
This article suggests that enumerated, specific rights 
regarding waters are not ersatz native title, and should 
not be treated as agglomerating into ‘non-exclusive title’. 
There are difficulties shared by claimants to onshore and 
offshore areas, but some are felt more acutely offshore. It 
is clear from earlier native title cases that customary rights 
are translated into roughly equivalent common law terms. 
This creates particular problems in offshore claims because 
of the common law’s dogged insistence that waters cannot be 
subject to exclusive rights. Consequently, in those cases that 
deliver partial success for claimants, certain specific rights to 
use and protect sea country, and to non-commercially harvest 
marine resources, are itemised. This is not native title. It is an 
aggregation of usufructuary and accessory rights. There is no 
plenary, underlying or residual interest. Moreover, there is 
no communal proprietary right, but rights to individuals to do 
certain things. Another clear manifestation of the distinction 
between onshore and offshore interests is found in the 
legislation regarding the right to negotiate: 
Evidently, since the right to negotiate does not apply 
to offshore areas, native title in marine areas is already 
considered from a legal point of view – prior to full resolution 
through the courts – as constituting a lesser property right 
than land-based native title rights.113 
The non-exclusive rights found regularly in the judgments are 
limited first in their scope and second by their imprecision. 
I maintain that those rights which are being included in 
judgments are in need of further clarification before they can 
be fully enjoyed.
Specifically, it is contended that usufructuary rights are 
lesser rights because of their individualised subjects 
and particularised parameters. Hebron notes that by 
characterising the rights relating to sacred sites as 
usufructuary, an opportunity to grant a stronger right is 
lost. He argues the spiritual importance of land (including 
waters) could have instead been interpreted as a right in 
toto, at least to the subsoil under the waters. The Living on 
Saltwater Country report makes the point that the marine 
interests of coastal Aboriginal communities ‘are not restricted 
to technical management issues, such as fisheries or marine 
protected areas’.114 Such commentary is important when 
realising that the reasoning undertaken by the Australian 
courts regarding sea country was not foreclosed. Successful 
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claims require claimants to show that laws and customs 
relating to lands (which are founded on spiritual beliefs) 
continue to be observed such that a traditional spiritual 
connection is maintained. If this is shown regarding dry 
land, courts are likely to find native title rather than some 
lesser right of a usufructuary nature. However, even when 
a spiritual connection is accepted in a sea country context, 
the courts are far less willing to grant native title. Instead, 
they become focused on how to express the particular rights 
the bench feels can be recognised. A spiritual connection 
appears to assist in successfully mounting a case when it 
relates to land, whereas spiritual connection has less impact 
in sea country claims because the less-generous option of 
usufructuary rights has become a habitual remedy which 
judges accept as a legitimate modification of a claim for full 
use and enjoyment.
Despite others being able to hold excusive proprietary rights 
in intertidal zones, regardless of public fishing and navigation 
rights, it seems that recognising native title to sea country is 
not possible because that would import exclusivity into the 
Indigenous interest. While pearling licences, for example, 
deliver de facto exclusive control of sea country, native title, 
which need not have the same exclusive results in application, 
will not be recognised. Justice Merkel commented thus 
in his dissent in Risk v Northern Territory: ‘there is nothing 
about the nature of an estate in fee simple that makes it 
inapplicable to the seabed’.115 Nevertheless, the reasoning of 
most judgments suggests any sort of title involving exclusive 
possession would be an unthinkable departure from the 
common law. Even Merkel J did not speak of rights in the 
waters themselves. These are obstacles sea country claims 
are running into, yet native title, with its implications of 
exclusivity, is recognised over land despite prevailing access 
rights of telecoms and government agents. Moreover, when 
a traditional interest is recognised, the courts readily see 
extinguishment because of an inconsistency between native 
title holding and public fishing and navigation rights. I have 
argued that, on a conceptual level, there is no inconsistency 
between these rights sufficient to extinguish title. I identified 
a ‘reading down’ approach to assist with the co-existence 
of interests. Certain state legislation also does not consider 
public access, Crown control over waterways or even 
statutory fishing rights as necessarily extinguishing title.116 
The absence of Crown ownership seems to forestall the inquiry 
into sea country native title before one even gets to questions 
of extinguishment, as, axiomatically, one cannot give that 
which one does not own. And yet the sovereign interest 
includes a power to grant ownership and other interests to 
others. Yarmirr (HCA) suggests the Crown interest might be 
understood as an exercise of the prerogative.117 Is sea country 
an exclusive category where an exercise of the prerogative 
may extinguish native title? Yarmirr (HCA) skirts that danger 
by holding that the interests asserted by Imperial authorities 
were not inconsistent with recognition of native tile.118 
The complexity of the jurisprudence regarding the different 
categories of sea; the confusion over the nature of the Crown 
interests; and the scant guidance as to how tradition and 
custom may be better presented or claimed in litigation 
suggests that native title over waters, as envisaged by the NTA, 
might never be won in court. There is a constant difficulty in 
conceptualising sea country title as anything but exclusive 
in exactly the way land is exclusive. This is combined with 
a failure to recognise that even an exclusive sea country 
interest can be reconciled with both public navigation and 
fishing rights. 
Howden warns that the existing patchwork of recognition 
may ‘eventually leave native title law looking like an artificial 
and unsupported construct of the common law’.119 Decisions 
on sea country claims seem to be accelerating towards that 
situation, and seem particularly insouciant in their attempts 
to recognise Indigenous interests. Many difficulties faced in 
offshore claims also arise onshore but it is evident that the 
offshore nature presents additional and discrete conceptual 
and practical difficulties for the judiciary.  I suggest that this 
added difficulty is exacerbating the existing fault lines in our 
native title jurisprudence.
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